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Virtualization has increased amongst the IT service providers as a method for achiev-
ing more eﬃcient server usage. This has led to the concept of cloud services, oﬀered
by large data centers with the help of virtualization techniques. Cloud service is
an abstract service, which provides IT services as self-service for the end user. For
example these services can provide virtual servers as on-demand.
Virtual servers in the cloud are usually reachable from the Internet, so their
protection is necessary. This master's thesis discusses ﬁrewalling virtual machines
inside the cloud, together with virtual ﬁrewall distributions and their features. Cloud
services are usually self-services and thus their cloud environment and ﬁrewall are
managed centrally. Automated ﬁrewall provisioning and management for a cloud
service is described.
Main goal for the master's thesis was to ﬁnd a feasible centrally managed security
system. Vyatta was used as a virtual ﬁrewall software and the test environment was
built on top of the Openstack cloud. Vyatta included ﬁrewall, VPN and routing
features suitable for enterprise usage.
The deployed virtual ﬁrewall performed well in the test environment with the
necessary features and also the central management worked without problems. The
central management system was feasible and reusable with other projects. Also the
automatic deployment of Openstack cloud was a feasible choice. However, using
Vyatta requires a lot of changes at least to the Openstack cloud platform, and hence
the network setup and management is diﬃcult.
There are on-going eﬀorts to virtualize networking devices in the data center as
well. This will allow the whole service platform to be centrally managed using a sin-
gle interface. Thus all changes to the network and new virtual service requests can
be executed as the customer demands them. Software Deﬁned Networking (SDN)
and Network Fuctions Virtualization (NFV) both drive the systems to more virtu-
alized and centrally managed environments, thus providing an important research
topic in this ﬁeld.
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Virtualisointi on kasvattanut suosiotaan IT -palveluntarjoajien keskuudessa parem-
man palvelinkapasiteetin hyötysuhteen saamiseksi. Virtualisointi on myös mahdol-
listanut pilvipalveluiden syntymisen. Pilvipalvelut ovat abstrakteja palveluja, jotka
tarjoavat asiakkaille IT -itsepalveluita esimerkiksi virtuaalipalvelmien muodossa.
Pilvessä olevat virtuaalipalvelimet on kytketty yleensä Internetiin, joten niiden
palomuurauksesta tulee huolehtia. Tässä diplomityössä tutkittiin palomuurausta
pilvessä sijaitseville virtuaalikoneille, virtuaalisia palomuurijakeluita ja niiden omi-
naisuuksia. Työssä käsitellään myös keskitettyä hallintaa, jonka avulla voidaan hal-
lita sekä pilvipalvelua että palomuuria. Tästä syystä tutkimuskohteena oli myöskin
palomuurin automaattinen provisiointi pilvipalveluun.
Diplomityössä rakennettiin pilvialustoille sopiva keskitetyn hallinnan palomuuri-
järjestelmä. Käytetty virtuaalinen palomuurijakelu oli nimeltään Vyatta ja koeym-
päristönä toimi Openstackin pilvialusta. Vyattasta löytyi yrityskäyttöön sopivat
palomuuraus-, VPN- ja reititysominaisuudet.
Toteutettu virtuaalinen palomuuri toimi kokonaisuudessaan hyvin, sen ominai-
suudet olivat riittävät ja keskitetty hallinta toimi moitteetta. Käytetyt menetelmät
keskitettyä hallintaa varten, ja Openstackin pilven automaattiset ominaisuudet, oli-
vat toimivia ratkaisuita. Vyattan käyttäminen vaatii silti paljon muutoksia Open-
stackin pilvialustan verkkoon, joten verkon rakentaminen ja hallinta tulevat vaikeiksi.
Tulevaisuudessa useat palvelinkeskuksen verkkolaitteet virtualisoidaan. Virtual-
isointi mahdollistaa koko verkon keskitetyn hallinnan käyttäen ohjelmistoja. Tällöin
verkon muutokset ja laitetarpeet voidaan toteuttaa välittömästi asiakkaan toiveiden
mukaan. Termit Software Deﬁned Networking (SDN) ja Network Functions Virtual-
ization (NFV) käsittelevät molemmat verkon virtualisointia ja keskitettyä hallintaa
ja ne ovat suunnannäyttäjiä verkkotekniikan tutkimukselle.
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11 INTRODUCTION
The evolution of data center services is again taking a leap forward. The previous
one occured when the virtualization techniques emerged and several systems were
consolidated into one hardware. Virtual systems have provoked the building of
computing environments from where companies and end users can buy resources
on-demand. These environments are called as cloud services. Cloud is an abstract
service which is based on highly virtualized systems and can be described as a self
service computing system.
Networking and communications often rise a question concerning the overall se-
curity of a speciﬁc system. A ﬁrewall is the basic building block for safe public
network connectivity. Firewalls are thus used locally in the operating systems or on
the border of internal networks to protect the whole network simultaneously. Fur-
ther, as the IPv4 addressing is depleting, the Network Address Translation (NAT)
system is often used to provide private address range for an internal network area.
Since cloud networks are often using private IP addressing, they require a device to
do the network address translation. It is also common to implement a ﬁrewall and
a NAT into the same device.
One of the most common cloud services is the Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS)
cloud. In IaaS cloud, the user requests for virtual machines that can be connected to
the Internet and thus require ﬁrewalling. The ﬁrewalling of a cloud virtual machine
is traditionally done using the cloud platform provider tools. However, for corporate
users the platform does not contain enough features. In addition, the cloud may be
used by a private user or a company, so separate cloud environments are commonly
built. Diﬀerent environments can be further built using separate cloud platform
providers depending on the needs of the cloud capacity.
These come together to form a system described in Figure 1.1. A service hosting
operator oﬀers cloud services for both private users and companies. The public cloud
meant for private use is built using an open source platform and the private cloud
using a commercial cloud platform provider. The management of the cloud system is
centralized to a cloud dashboard server which is responsible for operating with both
cloud platforms. If the inbuilt ﬁrewalling is insuﬃcient, other options such as virtual
ﬁrewall with Virtual Private Networks (VPN) need to be considered. Because the
virtual ﬁrewall operates in the cloud, a ﬁrewall management is convenient to add to
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the centralized cloud dashboard.
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Figure 1.1: An example of a cloud and central management system.
The overall system therefore relies on the central management and its capabili-
ties to operate all the necessary parts. However, since current cloud platforms do
not provide suﬃcient solutions to the ﬁrewall management problem, a prototype
implementation is built in this thesis.
The thesis includes theory concerning the ﬁrewall in the chapter 2. As the system
relies heavily on virtualization and cloud computing, the cloud is discussed in the
chapter 3. The chapter 4 describes the virtualized ﬁrewall, its environment and the
chosen system. Implementation of the system is discussed in the chapter 5.
32 NETWORK FIREWALL SYSTEMS
Firewall is often considered as the primary security element. However, it is only a
basic part of network security. A ﬁrewall is best described as a connection limitation
element, which denies undesirable access to the destination system. This chapter
describes what a ﬁrewall is, what it can protect and how it does that. Some example
implementations and best practices are also provided.
2.1 Fundamentals of Firewalling
A ﬁrewall in general is a limiting device or a piece of software running inside an op-
erating system to protect one or more computers or network devices from unwanted
packets travelling in the Internet. The most important job of a ﬁrewall is to decide
which traﬃc or connection is to be allowed through. The administrator speciﬁes
policies that control a number of criteria which in turn make decisions about the
received and transmitted packets.
First of the validation criteria is the source and destination IP address. A ﬁrewall
can make a decision whether it lets traﬃc through, based on an IP address only.
Filtering data according to an IP address is very convenient for example in company
internal networks. If data from a speciﬁc network address area is considered valid, a
rule based on that can be created. IP address spooﬁng may occur and it is described
in Section 2.3.
More speciﬁc criteria for data ﬁltering are the protocol ﬁeld and the port number
ﬁeld. Most common protocols are TCP, UDP and ICMP. For example WWW traﬃc
typically uses TCP port 80 and therefore an easy way to deny only WWW traﬃc
is to deny TCP protocol port 80 connections. Port numbers from 1-1023 are so
called well-known ports, that are meant for some special service or software. Ports
from 1024-49151 are registered to be used with vendor speciﬁc applications. The
remaining ports, from 49152 to 65535, are dynamic and they can be used by any
application. [1, p. 91]
Software ﬁrewalls protecting a single computer may sometimes be able to ﬁlter
traﬃc based on the target software in the system. In these cases the ﬁrewall ruleset
may look for addresses, ports or protocols, but it also veriﬁes the target software in
the system. This way the system may block any undesired software from reaching
the Internet.
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Before implementing a ﬁrewall, the following questions should be considered:
What really needs protection? Who are we protecting ourselves from? What must
be allowed? Asking these basic questions will lead to the best compromise between
ultimate security and usability. Some of the best practices in ﬁrewalling are overseen
in Section 2.4. [1]
2.2 Firewall Operation Modes
Firewalls are divided in two categories, gateway ﬁrewalls and application proxy ﬁre-
walls [1, p. 98]. The gateway ﬁrewalls are further divided into stateful inspection
ﬁrewalls and packet ﬁlters, also called as stateless ﬁrewalls. Despite the nomencla-
ture, the diﬀerent ﬁrewalls have their own place in the networking security. These
are discussed next.
2.2.1 Stateless Firewall
Packet ﬁlters are the simplest way to limit network connectivity. Filters are usually
lightweight and thus cause little extra load to the device running it. Therefore packet
ﬁlters are usually implemented in network devices such as routers that are designed
for other purposes, but can handle these ﬁlters.
Packet ﬁlters usually operate on the OSI level 3 [2, p. 6]. That causes the ﬁltering
to be based on the information in the IP haeder which in turn gives rise to the access
control lists (ACL), the foundation of packet ﬁlters. A ﬁrewall checks whether an
ACL contains a match clause to the packet travelling through the ﬁlter. The ACL
is usually read from top to bottom and in case a match clause is found, an ACL-
directed action takes place. In mismatch cases, a deny action usually is executed.
An example of an ACL is shown in the Appendix A in Cisco speciﬁc notation. The
ACL permits some ICMP protocol messages, DNS related traﬃc on top of UDP and
TCP, port 80 (WWW) directed traﬃc and DHCP traﬃc (bootps). At the end of
the ACL is the implicit deny action to ﬁlter out all other messages.
Though stateless packet ﬁlters are fast and commonly used, they have several
limitations. Due to the low OSI level placement, the ﬁlter cannot prevent an attack
on the application layer. The statelessness also means incapability to recognize
TCP/IP spooﬁng attacks. In general, all upper layer functions are out of reach.
Normal network activity sometimes requires a ﬁrewall to open a certain port to
establish a connection. However a stateless ﬁrewall is unable to keep track of the
destination and source of the connection which compromises security. This problem
gave rise to the stateful ﬁrewall system. [2, p. 6]
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2.2.2 Stateful Firewall
A stateful ﬁrewall is in essence a stateless ﬁrewall which operates on the OSI level 4
and thus processes more information [2]. It provides session veriﬁcation for connec-
tion oriented protocol, TCP. For each TCP connection, an own session is made and
a port is opened on the local computer to receive traﬃc from a remote system. The
same port must be opened in the ﬁrewall to maintain a connection between these
two.
This kind of a connection places the local computer under the risk of intrusion.
The stateful ﬁrewall addresses the issue by keeping a state-table containing all out-
bound connections made by the stateful (TCP) protocol. The inbound connections
are accepted based on the source IP address, protocol and port. In addition, the
stateful inspection veriﬁes the incoming TCP packets to belong to an established
connection. For other protocols, the stateful ﬁrewall operates as a packet ﬁlter.
The stateful inspection requires higher performance from the hardware than the
packet ﬁltering due to the state table it maintains. It is also the reason why the
stateful ﬁrewalls are generally considered more secure than the packet ﬁlters. The
stateful ﬁrewalls are, however, inconvenient to use as the ﬁrst traﬃc ﬁltering elements
in high bandwidth networks. Despite all, the stateful ﬁrewall is considered secure
enough and performs well in most cases as a single ﬁrewall device for a company
internal network. [2, p. 11]
2.2.3 Application Proxy Firewall
A proxy is a system, which receives messages and re-sends them on behalf of an orig-
inal source. An application proxy ﬁrewall, sometimes called as a reverse proxy, does
the same kind of forwarding but it also examines the messages and makes forward-
ing decisions based on a ruleset. The ruleset may for instance contain information
about undesired patterns or messages speciﬁed by the network administrator. Based
on the packet examination, the proxy ﬁrewall veriﬁes the validity of the message.
The valid messages are rewritten and sent to the destination, otherwise the ﬁrewall
rejects the message. An example ruleset of the SMTP application proxy denying
spam or abuse cases is shown in the Appendix B. [1, p. 99]
The application proxy ﬁrewall oﬀers a lot of security. The greatest advance is that
incoming messages are ﬁrst sent to the proxy and then forwarded to the intended
destination [1, p. 99]. This way the backend server is protected from any direct
connections. Since the application proxy operates on the application level of the
OSI model, all levels can be inspected. Moreover, the message inspection provides
extensive logging capabilities that may reveal hacking attempts [2].
There are drawbacks to the application proxy ﬁrewall as well. One of the greatest
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is the need for processing time. Because the message is carefully examined, the
ﬁrewall spends a lot of time to complete each packet. Thus the application proxy
is not the system of choice for the high bandwidth or real-time systems. The setup
and maintaining of this kind of a ﬁrewall is highly challenging which discourages the
building of an application proxy for each server. [2, p. 14]
2.2.4 Implementations in the Networks
The diﬀerent ﬁrewalls have their own purposes in networking. An example network
setup containing all the diﬀerent ﬁrewall techniques and their necessary features is
shown in Figure 2.1. Regardless of the network structure, more than one ﬁrewall
can be used and it is even recommended especially if the network is extensive.
Multiple layers of ﬁrewalls defend the network eﬃciently and thus provide a safer
environment.
Internet
Packet filter
firewall
Stateful inspection 
firewall
DMZ
Application 
proxy 
firewall
User access 
servers
Public access servers
Secure public access 
servers
Secure user access 
servers
Application 
proxy 
firewall
Stateful inspection 
firewall
Internal network
User 
computers
Content Delivery 
Network
Figure 2.1: Example ﬁrewalling schema.
The network presented in Figure 2.1 is connected to the Internet using a packet
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ﬁlter ﬁrewall. The packet ﬁlter is the only ﬁrewall limiting the network connectivity
to the content delivery network (CDN). A CDN requires a lot of bandwidth and
hence the packet ﬁlter is the ﬁrewall of choice. The internal network is further
secured by a stateful ﬁrewall. Thus it contains all the user computers and servers,
as well as application proxy ﬁrewalls to enhance the security of some vital servers like
database or mail system. The demilitarized zone (DMZ) is likewise placed behind
a stateful inspection ﬁrewall and, further, contain the application proxy.
The network defense described above includes ﬁrewalling from the lightest to the
heaviest solution and also from the most generic to the most speciﬁc. The packet
ﬁlter ﬁrewall is best placed on the border of the network and the Internet. As
the packet ﬁlter feature implemented in a router requires little capacity and can
easily handle large amounts of data, it won't reduce performance of the router. In
the example shown in Figure 2.1 the stateful ﬁrewalls are then placed behind the
packet ﬁlter to secure the organization's internal network and DMZ. This way the
stateful ﬁrewall maintains the session tables and protects against attacks let through
by the packet ﬁlter. As some traﬃc is blocked by the stateless ﬁrewall, it lightens
the load on the stateful ﬁrewall. The application proxies should be placed as the
last ﬁrewalls in front of the servers requiring highest security. A more common
implementation, however, is to use only a stateful ﬁrewall to ﬁlter all traﬃc on the
edge of the network. This ﬁrewall hence provides stateful inspection for TCP and
packet ﬁltering for other protocols.
2.3 Preventing Attacks
Manufacturers or developers may have built special features on ﬁrewall systems to
prevent some speciﬁc kinds of network attacks. These attack recognition systems
deliver speciﬁc policies to a ﬁrewall which then operates as a limiting element. Below
are described some of the most common systems that operate to support ﬁrewall.
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) are an eﬀective means for identifying network
attacks or hacking attempts. There are two diﬀerent main types of recognition
systems, a signature-based and an anomaly-based. The signature-based system seeks
signatures for commonly known attacks whereas the anomaly-based system creates
statistics to represent the normal network activity and acts when an alteration is
found. However, the IDS only gathers the information into a log and it is up to the
administrator to take action. [3]
Intrusion prevention systems (IPS) include all the IDS features in addition to an
automatic action for incidents. Some common procedures for preventing attacks are
terminating the connection or session, blocking access to the target due to a speciﬁc
attack attribute such as source IP, and blocking access to the destination resource.
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[4]
Deep packet inspection (DPI) is a method, that integrates a stateful ﬁrewall
with intrusion detection and prevention systems. The stateful ﬁrewall examines the
received packet and the intrusion detection system will inspect the message carried.
The DPI provides signiﬁcant beneﬁt when compared to a traditional stateful ﬁrewall
system because the message is also inspected for fraud patterns. The disadvantage
of the DPI is that it requires a lot of computating power due to the heavy modifying
of the packet as well as the need for the application state information. [5]
The methods presented above detect attacks below application layer. However,
nowdays more and more traﬃc uses common service ports and protocols such as
HTTP. This has caused the protocol and port based ﬁrewalling to be less eﬀective.
Gartner (2009) has presented the Next-Generation Firewall (NGFW) to be a system
detecting and preventing these attacks in both inbound and outbound directions. It
is also declared that the IPS and DPI methods are ineﬀective against these attacks
[6]. Also, the Spire research (2004) claims: "The deterministic intrusion prevention
is the next generation ﬁrewall with deep packet inspection." [7]. The NGFW is
a system that evaluates the protocol stack all the way to the application level and
protects systems within the network from malicious traﬃc that may be hidden inside
common traﬃc.
2.4 Best Practices
Firewall solutions as a research topic have been going on for years. While the devel-
opment of the security systems progresses, also the intrusions and attacks become
more sophisticated. Security issues are widely considered resulting in some best
practices in network security.
Building a ﬁrewalling system begins by planning a ﬁrewalling design. The design
should include information such as what needs to be protected, from whom, what
methods and devices are in use and how to protect the destination. Also possible
bottlenecks and performance issues need consideration.
The out directed ﬁltering is often forgotten. Companies tend to maintain the
inbound data ﬁltering  whether stateful or stateless  well, but no outbound limi-
tation rules are used. The outbound limitation rules are very delicate to plan but
are worth having, because by ﬁltering out directed traﬃc some infected computers
can be prevented from sending data into the Internet. Compromised systems in the
internal network are unfortunately a reality. For example, the Internet Relay Chat
(IRC) protocol is often used by malicious software to communicate with hackers [1,
p. 117]. Thus by denying connection from typical IRC ports, it may be possible to
prevent computers from ending up in a botnet or the likes.
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Layered security architecture, also called as the defense in depth, enhance the
security of the ﬁrewalling. The main concern is to eﬃciently prevent breaking into
systems while still providing a fully functional network. The defense in depth also
provides security when a server has been compromised, since the network is protected
from itself also. An example network built with defense in depth is shown in Figure
2.2.
Network 1
(Workstations, 
Sales)
Network 2
(Servers, 
production)
Network 3
( Workstation, 
development)
Network 4
(Servers, Internal 
use)
Network 5
(VPN Endpoint)
Network n
Network
Internet
Figure 2.2: Defense in depth example network.
This network contains two diﬀerent types of ﬁrewalls: the stateless and the state-
ful. The ﬁrewall between the "Internet" and the "Network" is stateless and the
others are stateful. The stateless ﬁrewall should be replaced by a stateful one if the
device can handle traﬃc ﬂow. The purpose of multiple ﬁrewalls is to have the net-
works separated by their function and vulnerability. The separation can be based on
the role of the servers and workstations in the entity. This creates an environment
where one network area can be protected from the others. Even if one network is
compromised, the others remain safe.
Figure 2.1 demonstrates a basic defense in depth ﬁrewalling by containing a num-
ber of separated zones. Each network is an zone of its an own and the most important
computers are placed behind several ﬁrewalls from the Internet. The ﬁgure also il-
lustrates the use of an application proxy ﬁrewall as the protector of a single server,
which is the recommendation.
When using zones, in a ﬁrewall or router device, an ethernet interface is applied
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in a zone. Policies and routing decisions take place between zones. Figure 2.3 shows
an example of a traditional zone setup. The router contains four diﬀerent interfaces
and four diﬀerent zones. One of these is a local zone. In the zone based ﬁrewalling
all traﬃc must travel from one zone to the other. A local zone has been invented to
allow traﬃc to the router itself. However this is not compulsory.
DMZLocal zone
Intranet zone
Internet 
zone
eth0
eth1
eth2eth3
LAN 1
Servers
Workstations
Internet
Figure 2.3: Router example zone assignment
Other common zones include Internet, internal network and a DMZ zone. As
shown in Figure 2.1, the main purpose of the DMZ is to contain all public servers.
The packet ﬁlter and the stateful ﬁrewall preceding the DMZ contain open ports
to allow traﬃc to services running in the public access servers while the internal
network remains closed. If more security is desired for a server within the DMZ, it
can be placed behind an application proxy ﬁrewall, for instance, or in another DMZ
where the ﬁrewall policies are stricter.
In the example zone assignment (Figure 2.3), the Internet is connected to the
router only via eth0 interface. The router is further connected to the DMZ by the
eth1 interface whereas the internal network zone connects to it by both eth2 and
eth3 interfaces. The latter interfaces are bonded together to share an IP address
and they are therefore considered as a one logical security area containing the same
security policies.
The deny action should always be used as the default setting in the ﬁrewall.
Exceptions can then be added to allow required traﬃc. This way the risk for an
accidental harmful ﬁrewall policy is minimized.
Each network, or zone, should have speciﬁc ﬁrewall rules in both directions. The
ﬁrewalling policies should exist between all zones, including internal network and
the DMZ. The servers in the DMZ are naturally more vulnerable to attacks, so some
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of them may become compromised, yet the internal network remains safe thanks to
ﬁrewall policies. Additional security to the internal network of a company against
attacks from within is brought by the diﬀerent zones and the defense in depth. In
general, any user having access to the local internal network should be considered as
a potential threat [2, p. 21]. A direct access to the network enables traﬃc sniﬃng
or attacks against the servers that can be reached from the internal zones.
These guidelines about organization ﬁrewalling are methods to enhance network
security. Unfortunately there is no silver bullet for making a secure network. Some
essential elements are network monitoring devices and an established plan for dis-
covered attacks. However, true security comes only from the persistent development
of the security architecture.
12
3 CLOUD SYSTEMS
The cloud systems are computational systems providing an environment for running
large numbers of program code or operating systems (OS). Especially servers hosted
in a cloud system require virtualization by the cloud platform. The virtualization
is thus a key feature in the cloud system.
This chapter will discuss virtualization in general, how cloud relates to it, what
a cloud environment is and capacity viewpoints. As the cloud environment grows
larger, an universal and easy method for communicating with diﬀerent parts is
required. This chapter also covers the management of a cloud environment, its
networking and ﬁrewalling.
3.1 Virtualization Trend
In the computing context, virtualization can be considered as an abstraction of a
service, storage, device or network. Implementations include computers, devices and
software just to name a few. Virtualization lowers the costs of hardware remarkably
and reduces idling of hardware by providing software acting like hardware.
Virtualization is not limited only to virtual machines. Almost anything can be
virtualized as denoted by Ameen and Hamo in: "Survey of server virtualization"
[8]. An entire computer can be virtualized, or only the desktop, for instance. In
desktop virtualization, the desktop is located on a server and displayed elsewhere.
Storage virtualization reserves logical blocks from a physical storage device. These
are only a few examples of virtualization. Virtualization consolidates resources used
by multiple parties into one hardware system.
Virtualization has grown rapidly over last few years especially among the hosting
operators. With virtualization, hosting companies may have more than one oper-
ating system running in hardware. A piece of software running multiple operating
systems simultaneously is called a hypervisor, and the system running a hypervi-
sor software is referred to as a host machine. A hypervisor provides a platform for
virtual machines (VM) that are also known as guest machines. The hypervisor can
further be separated in to two main types. The hypervisors of type 1 run directly
on hardware, whereas the type 2 hypervisors run on a host operating system. Type
1 is also known as a bare metal, or native, and type 2 as a hosted hypervisor. Both
of these are built on top of an operating system. The diﬀerence is that the type 1
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host operating system is for hosting VMs only and the type 2 host operating system
is a regular desktop OS such as Windows 7 with a VirtualPC hypervisor for running
the VMs. [8]
The power of server virtualization comes from running several operating systems
parallel in a piece of hardware. Virtual machines can change their host machines
ﬂuently on the go in large virtual environments. Furthermore, snapshots can be
created of the VM to transfer the VM to another environment. Thus a server
operating system can accurately be set up in the hypervisor. [9]
The easy deployment of the VM is the key to popularity. In traditional virtu-
alization the deployment process can only be done by the system administrator.
However, the need for rapid server delivery for the end user has been rising among
the VM hosting operators. The answer is a cloud environment.
3.2 The Cloud in a Nutshell
The Cloud is an abstract service usually based on highly virtualized environments
that can be activated as an on-demand self-service and that gets billed by the usage.
Cloud VMs are always available in the Internet and are easily deployable. The
cloud should not be limited only to virtual servers as the following common levels
of services already exist: Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS), Platform-as-a-Service
(PaaS) and Software-as-a-Service (SaaS). Their relationship is displayed in Figure
3.1.
The SaaS delivers the contents of the highest OSI layer to the user. In Software-
as-a-Service the software publisher sells to the end user only the software access via
the Internet. Software is then delivered as a service when requested by the user.
[11]
The PaaS hosts a platform for an application development environment that
includes all the necessary modules for software developing. With the PaaS systems
the developer is able to focus on the product instead of the environment. Software
developed using the PaaS tools is often run in the cloud as a SaaS system. [12]
The IaaS is on a lower in OSI level compared with SaaS or PaaS. With this
service the customers, also called as tenants, can rapidly deploy servers to evaluate
a system scenario or software. A tenant can be either an individual user or a
company that controls a speciﬁc set of virtual servers inside the cloud. As the
IaaS cloud operates on a pay-as-you-go model, the costs are minimal in short term
use. Also the deployment and testing phases become easier with software licensing.
However, in long term use the costs may rise above the value of hardware. [13]
The IaaS cloud can be done with hardware only, but this requires a complex
management system. The IaaS thus beneﬁts from virtualization because of the easy
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Software-as-a-Service
(e.g. Salesforce,Google Apps, Microsoft Office 365)
Platform-as-a-Service
(e.g. Google App engine, OpenShift)
Infrastructure-as-a-Service
(e.g. Amazon Web Services, Elastichosts, Rackspace)
Development tools, databases, message queues, scalability, web servers
Computing (virtual machines), storage, networking
Software service
Figure 3.1: Cloud service stack [10]
and fast setup of the virtual machines. Virtual machines are also called as instances
when they are placed in the cloud. A speciality of the instances is that they have
some highly dynamic resources available. These resources are further used as ﬂavors
in the instances. Each instance has its own ﬂavor that speciﬁes the number of virtual
CPUs, the amount of memory and the hard disk assigned to it. A ﬂavor follows its
instance in the cloud when transferred from one host to another. The instances can
be freely moved inside the cloud and this is usually done automatically to balance
the load in the cloud platform. The moving operation is also called as migration.
Hardware systems hosting the cloud can vary a lot, being either a single server or
a full-sized server farm. The size depends on the needs of the system. If only a proof-
of-concept is intended, an IaaS cloud can be set up in a VM. On the other hand,
a full-sized multi-tenant cloud environment requires a great deal of capacity. Also
commodity hardware, meaning hardware no longer used for production, sometimes
runs the cloud.
Cloud systems include four diﬀerent deployment models: private, community,
public and hybrid cloud. Private clouds are for one organization only. A community
cloud is shared between co-working groups. The private and community clouds
are usually managed by the owner of the cloud. Public clouds are available for
everybody including individual users, groups and companies. They are set up and
sold by organizations specialized in cloud services. A cloud infrastructure including
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two or more of the clouds presented above is called a hybrid cloud. The hybrid
cloud is often customized and priced depending on the customer requirements. It
also oﬀers a good platform as the backend solutions are separated, yet data and
applications can be migrated between the clouds. [14]
Cloud platform providers such as Openstack or VMWare can be used to set up a
cloud with any of the presented cloud deployment models, and all the deployment
models can be created using one or more cloud platforms. The cloud set up using
more than one platform provider is called a multi-platform cloud. When a private
cloud is set up using one platform and a public cloud using another, it becomes a
multi-platform hybrid cloud. A common implementation is to have a public cloud
deployed on top of an open-source cloud platform provider and a private cloud on
top of a commercial cloud platform provider.
Openstack is one of the open-source cloud computing projects. It aims to provide
comprehensive software to manage vast amounts of resources for the cloud [15]. The
Openstack architecture consists of diﬀerent nodes, that are responsible for speciﬁc
service areas. Figure 3.2 displays these and their relationships. The diﬀerent archi-
tecture parts are a network, a block storage, a compute, an image service, an object
storage, an identity and a dashboard [16].
Figure 3.2: Openstack conceptual architecture [16]
The virtual machines are running in the compute node and the other parts pro-
vide supporting elements for them. The network is responsible for the network
connectivity and the image service provides storage volumes for the VMs. The im-
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age service stores actual virtual disk ﬁles to the object storage. The only visible
part for the user is the dashboard which provides the frontend service. The identity
service authenticates the use use of all these parts. The parts also need to commu-
nicate with others in an eﬀective way in order to have a stable and fast environment
for the customer. The messaging between nodes is done using universal Application
Programming Interface (API). [16]
3.3 Managing Large Scale Cloud Environment
Cloud environments set up using multiple platform provider products can be cen-
trally managed by a set of custom tools. One of these is REST API which is discussed
in this section. Also a central management tool, Deltacloud, is brieﬂy explained.
3.3.1 REST API
ARepresentational State Transfer API (REST API) features the use of URI-identiﬁed
resources and commands instead of traditional application state resources. The ben-
eﬁt is that the server is no longer required to maintain a session. Without the state
information the resource can be freely used all the time, making it the possible for
many clients to use the same application resource simultaneously. [17]
The REST is built on top of an HTTP. The HTTP is an access method for appli-
cations that communicate using REST URI statements. This way the application
does not need any speciﬁc protocol for communication as this happens ﬂuently with
HTTP traﬃc. There are four main types of messages implemented in the REST
system: put, get, post and delete.
The put message generates a new resource to the server and this is used afterwards
by other messages to identify the right sessions. A put message returns the resource
URI to the client in message exchange. A get message sends a message to the
server application and requests for data information from the speciﬁc URI. With
post messages it is possible to send information to the server for updating. The
update can either be for an existing resource, or it can create a new resource which
then returns the information like the put message. After a resource is no longer
needed, it should be deleted by sending a delete message to appropriate URI. [17]
3.3.2 The Deltacloud
The Deltacloud provides an abstraction layer for managing cloud environments set
up by using products of many platform providers. It oﬀers three distinctive API
layers to work with diﬀerent cloud systems: Deltacloud classic API, Distributed
Management Task Force Cloud Infrastructure Management Interface (DMTF CIMI)
API or EC2 API [18]. The cloud set up with multiple cloud platforms can thus
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be managed by a central management portal. An overview of the Deltacloud is
displayed in Figure 3.3. Customers connect to the deltacloud REST API through
client software and the deltacloud provides the connectivity, for example to EC2,
through "deltacloud-driver-ec2" driver. EC2 refers to Amazon Elastic Compute
cloud [19].
Figure 3.3: Deltacloud overview [18]
The drivers are not limited only to the commercial cloud operators such as Ama-
zon or Rackspace. There are also a number of open-source cloud platforms (Open-
stack, Eucalyptus). The cloud environments can have parts from a commercial cloud
platform like VMWare vCloud as well as from a free open-source environment, and
yet be managed by the same portal.
An environment running more than one cloud operating system simultaneously
provides environment with a very high availability. The customers will rarely end up
with an entirely unaccessible cloud. When a cloud set up on one platform provider
environment crashes, the other system will still be functional. Naturally the VMs
in a crashed cloud are unusable, but at least the customers will be able to launch
new virtual machines in another cloud operating in the Deltacloud.
3.4 Hypervisor Capacity and Load Estimation
Virtual machines running in hardware share its resources. This may be done equally
or by approximating the need for resources for each VM. A hypervisor allocates a
number of CPUs, physical memory and disk for VMs. The CPU, the disk and
the memory are classiﬁed as private by the VM, but in reality the hypervisor shares
these with all virtual machines. This causes capacity problems when many machines
require plenty of a particular resource.
"VM consolidation: A real case based on OpenStack Cloud" by Corradi, Farelli
and Foschini discusses VM CPU performance related to the host CPU in the Open-
stack Diablo cloud. The test environment was running Intel Core Duo E7600
@3.06GHz CPU and had Kernel Virtual Machine (KVM) as a hypervisor. The
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virtual machines contained one virtual CPU (VCPU) with fair processor scheduling
by the host system. The results of the CPU load experiment are shown in Figure
3.4. [20]
Figure 3.4: VCPU Load (A), aggregated host CPU load (B), and power consumption (C)
for the raw VCPU test. [20]
The VCPU load graph (A) demonstrates the virtual CPU state when more virtual
machines are added to the hypervisor. On the X axis are the number of virtual
machines running, on the Y axis is the actual VCPU load per VM and the lines
display the amount of required VCPU load. There are two physical CPUs, which
is directly seen on the graph: the two virtual machines with a 99% CPU load
requirement can both use almost as much computing power as they need. However,
right after the third VM the load increases and the CPU time has to be shared
between the virtual machines, which causes loss of VCPU performance on each VM.
As more virtual machines with high requested CPU times are added, each VM ends
up having less and less CPU time.
In Figure 3.4 the host CPU load graph (B) displays the hypervisor CPU usage
with changing number of VMs and their loads. The Y axis represents the hypervisor
CPU load and the maximum is 200% because the host contains two CPUs. As in
the VCPU load graph (A), the knee point comes after the second VM. The host
manages well two machines at the most. When the third VM requires CPU time
more than approximately 80%, the host CPU is too heavily loaded to provide the
CPU time requested. The knee point also correlates with the number of physical
CPU cores. The VCPU loads drop when the host CPU reaches a 200% usage.
This may cause problems in a hypervisor that has a constant load. The constant
load occurs especially with a VM running a router, a ﬁrewall or a VPN service. A
hypervisor operating with such virtual machines should be designed to answer the
needs of the expected normal VM state.
Virtualization reduces the idling of hardware and the power required per VM. In
Figure 3.4 the power usage graph (C) displays the power consumption of diﬀerent
VCPU loads with an increasing amount of virtual machines. The knee point, like
before, is reached when the hypervisor becomes fully loaded. As a conclusion, an
environment can handle a lot of virtual machines as long as they don't require
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constant high CPU usage.
3.5 Firewalling and Network Abstraction in the Open-
stack Cloud
Cloud virtual machines require ﬁrewalling as well as physical computers. It is com-
mon to ﬁrewall either a single cloud VM or the whole network where the VM belongs
to. Because of the abstract network topology in cloud computing, ﬁrewalling is, un-
like in the traditional network, done by security groups in the Openstack cloud.
A security group is a ﬁrewall ruleset that contains at least one statement including
protocol, destination and source port, as well as source address statements for each
group. The security group is then mapped in the Linux iptables that provides a
stateful ﬁrewall for the client virtual machines [21]. Iptables is a Linux package that
conﬁgures the Linux kernel ﬁrewall. Iptables is stateless by default but the network
conﬁguration script changes it to become stateful. The iptables ﬁrewalling has a
wide understanding of the diﬀerent networking protocols but security groups can
only be conﬁgured for regular TCP, UDP and ICMP traﬃc in the Openstack [22].
A typical network and ﬁrewall setup is shown in Figure 3.5. Each tenant, or
customer, controls a number of VMs located in the network area reserved for that
speciﬁc customer. The IP addressing in these networks is done by using a private
addressing range. The Internet connection for VMs is accomplished with the use
of a NAT. The NAT translates private IP addresses to public IP addresses. In
the Openstack cloud platform, these public IP addresses are called as ﬂoating IP
addresses.
A ﬂoating IP is a public IP address that follows the client VM in the cloud. The
ﬂoating IP is bound to a speciﬁc VM using 1:1 NAT. Even if a customer requires
a direct public IP address to the VM, a private IP, NAT and ﬂoating IP, are used.
Without this, a transparent live migration between cloud compute nodes would not
be possible when using a traditional network.
The Openstack cloud networking node uses a networking namespace to isolate
traﬃc inside a single cloud node. In namespace several networking layers are run
parallel in Linux with each layer having its own ﬁrewall, NAT policies and routing
table. Thus namespace is a totally isolated environment that has its own networking
stack. It tolerates overlapping IP addressing ranges for client networks. [22]
Although the networking in the cloud platform is very abstract, it requires a lot of
diﬀerent virtual components such as interfaces, ports and switches to be fully func-
tional. Further, the individual virtual machines in the cloud also need them to gain
connectivity to the Internet or to other VMs. The Openstack has approached this
in the Grizzly release by using a separate Networking-as-a-Service called Neutron
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Figure 3.5: Typical cloud networking and ﬁrewall structure.
(formerly Quantum) [23]. The Neutron relies on diﬀerent virtual plugins running
in a host Linux OS. Traditionally, the Open vSwitch plugin is used together with
other plugins to provide network functionality.
The Open vSwitch is an open-source L2 virtual switch especially designed to
transfer traﬃc both between the VMs and with the outside world. The vSwitch is
thus responsible for transferring traﬃc inside a single cloud node and between all
VMs in a single hypervisor. Another plugin similar to vSwitch is a Linux bridge
plugin. The Linux bridge acts like a virtual hub, repeating every message it receives
to all other ports. The Linux bridge could even replace the Open vSwitch, but it
lacks the necessary features such as VLAN.
However, the vSwitch and the Linux bridge need to be connected to other plugins
inside a cloud node. This can be accomplished by using a plugin called virtual
ethernet (VETH) pair. A VETH interface transmits all traﬃc it receives directly to
another VETH interface and thus can be considered as a virtual patch cable.
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Because the physical network contains L3 devices such as routers, the virtual net-
work needs also their equivalent. The Open vSwitch uses internal ports to operate
as an L3 interface. The internal ports are used for routing or Dynamic Host Conﬁg-
uration Protocol (DHCP) server, for example. DHCP server allocates automatically
IP addresses for devices in a network. A DHCP is thus required for an automatic
IP address allocation for VMs in the cloud. The Neutron uses a DHCP server called
dnsmasq to provide this.
An interface is also an imporant part of a virtual network. It is required to
connect to either a physical network or a VM. A physical interface such as eth0 is
an entrance point to a physical network. A virtual interface called TAP is used
inside a virtual system. A TAP device is an L2 level virtual ethernet interface that
is especially used in a cloud hypervisor to communicate with a VM. A TAP device
is named as vnetX where the X is a running number of the interface.
When using the Open vSwitch plugin for a network environment in the Openstack
cloud platform a network setup for both compute and network node is required. The
networking node structure is shown in Figure 3.6 and the compute node network
structure in Figure 3.7.
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Figure 3.6: Networking node structure [22].
A public network and the networking node are connected by an interface named
eth0 in Figure 3.6. Incoming traﬃc is forwarded from the eth0 to an open vSwitch
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br-ex. The internal ports qg-VVV, qr-YYY and qr-ZZZ form a router responsible
for transferring traﬃc between the open vSwitches br-ex and br-int. A namespace
is used to create the router. The ports tapXXX and tapWWW are connected to
the br-int vSwitch and they are considered as DHCP server ports. Thus the virtual
port tapXXX operates as a DHCP server and the port qr-YYY as a router for the
network in VLAN 1.
The vSwitch br-int is responsible for keeping virtual network traﬃc isolated. The
internal VLAN ID that is used for isolation is converted to a suitable global VLAN
ID between the vSwitches br-int and br-eth1. A VETH pair (int-br-eth1, phy-br-
eth1 ) between vSwitches makes the data ﬂow. The vSwitch br-eth1 is also connected
to the interface eth1 to gain access to a private network.
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Figure 3.7: Compute node network structure [22].
The private network is responsible for transferring data between all the compute
and network nodes. It can also be described as a backbone network for internal
cloud traﬃc. The compute node virtual network structure and its connection to the
internal network is shown in Figure 3.7. In this example, the internal network is
connected to the eth1 interface at the compute node. The eth1 is then connected to a
virtual switch br-eth1 and this is further connected to another vSwitch br-int. Again,
these two vSwitches are required to make a VLAN ID conversion between the global
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and internal VLAN IDs. The virtual switches br-eth1 and br-int are connected by
using the same VETH pair (int-br-eth1, phy-br-eth1 ) as in the networking node.
The vSwitch integration bridge (br-int) running in the compute node (Figure
3.7) is the central part of the virtual network structure. The virtual networks are
separated by using customer speciﬁc VLAN IDs on the br-int vSwitch. Therefore
all VMs in the same VLAN communicate through this vSwitch inside a single hy-
pervisor.
There is one end of a VETH interface for each VM to connect them with the
br-int vSwitch. The interfaces are named as qvoXXX, qvoYYY etc. The other end
of the VETH interface pair is named qvbXXX and it connects to a VM speciﬁc
virtual Linux Bridge device named qbrXXX. The XXX part in the name identiﬁes
the interface or bridge to belong to a single VM. A virtual TAP interface like vnet0
is connected to each Linux Bridge and is also the VM interface seen by the guest
OS. The TAP interface needs to be connected to the vSwitch via the Linux Bridge
because the iptables rules are assigned to the TAP interface and the Open vSwitch
is not compatible with TAP interfaces that contain iptables rules.
As a conclusion, the Openstack cloud platform provides a virtual network envi-
ronment that mimics the structure of a physical network. The current conﬁgurable
parts, the ﬁrewall and the NAT, are however seldom enough for a more advanced
user. The complexity of the network plugins is necessitated by the existence of multi-
ple networks as well as the NAT and ﬁrewall features. Unfortunately this also means
that additional means of security are diﬃcult or almost impossible to implement.
Another solution like a virtual ﬁrewall is thus implicated.
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4 THE VIRTUAL FIREWALL
Firewalling in the cloud can be done using either a cloud platform provider im-
plementation, a hardware appliance, or a virtual machine inside the cloud itself.
This chapter describes the current problems in ﬁrewall implementations, how the
ﬁrewalling of a cloud network is traditionally done and future prospects. Also the
centralized management is considered in this chapter.
4.1 Security-as-a-Service Concept
A traditional way to ﬁlter traﬃc in the cloud network is to use the cloud platform's
own ﬁrewall. However, common features in the ﬁrewall appliances such as VPN,
IDS, load balancing and routing are currently not available in the Openstack cloud
platform for example. Even if a cloud platform provider implements more features,
these may be missing from the other providers, which causes problems in a multi-
platform cloud environment.
An alternative is a separate security solution featuring a stateful ﬁrewall, a VPN
endpoint and also a routing daemon. The cloud environment also requires a suitable
networking structure to operate with a ﬁrewall VM. Controlling a VM in the cloud
is usually done via a local console or an SSH connection. A centralized management
through public network is needed for the multi-platform hybrid cloud, requiring a
REST API or some similar feature from the security solution. The multi-platform
hybrid cloud requires a multi-purpose ﬁrewall VM that can be launched on-demand
in the cloud and used as a gateway device for a speciﬁc cloud network segment. This
concept is known as Security-as-a-Service (SECaaS).
The SECaaS concept may provide all the missing features described above in
addition to many more which are required by the hosting operator or the customer.
The SECaaS may for example be a fully sized NGFW that monitors network traﬃc
for intrusions. Also the SECaaS oﬀers a great visibility to a single ﬁrewall and to the
whole network because all SECaaS devices are controlled centrally from the cloud
management and they report their state to the control center. In addition to logging
capabilities through the central management, also conﬁgurations for desired services
can be distributed to a number of devices.
The cloud network can likewise be protected by an external ﬁrewall appliance.
However, the deployment time for such an appliance is longer than for a virtualized
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one. Also the virtual ﬁrewall is usually the best choice because the cloud is meant
to oﬀer on-demand services for the user with the pay-as-you-go -model.
4.2 Virtualizing the Firewall to Cloud
A virtual ﬁrewall is usually set up on top of Linux or Unix and it runs a special
set of software capable of operating as both a router and a ﬁrewall. The features
of a virtualized ﬁrewall and a traditional ﬁrewall appliance are mostly alike. The
major diﬀerence is the device running the ﬁrewall engine. A ﬁrewall appliance is a
physical device, whereas a virtualized ﬁrewall is just a bunch of code running inside
a hypervisor.
Since the virtual ﬁrewall is a VM running inside a hypervisor, it can be cloned.
Therefore it is relatively easy to clone the required amount of ﬁrewall VMs to provide
ﬁrewalls for multiple separate networks. The virtual ﬁrewalls can exist in the cloud
which opens new deployment options. For instance, the ﬁrewall can be launched as
an on-demand self-service using the pay-as-you-go billing. This means that the end
user is no longer required to wait for the vendor to deliver the appliance. Instead of
the traditional physical appliances, the ﬁrewalling and network setup is done using
only software.
The virtual ﬁrewall functionality is based on a VM containing at least two in-
terfaces between which the ﬁrewalling is done. The cloud network traditionally
operates by using private IP addressing and thus the virtual ﬁrewall is required to
use a NAT between the interfaces. The virtual ﬁrewall transfers the NAT and the
ﬁrewall operations from the cloud platform solution, such as Openstack Neutron,
to a virtual machine running in the same cloud. This makes the load caused by
the ﬁrewall and NAT to the Neutron module to be distributed in the computation
nodes of the cloud. The conventional packet ﬂow in the Openstack network using
the Open vSwitch plugin from the end user to the VM is shown in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1 contains the network structures that were described in depth in Section
3.5. There are two main parts: the cloud platform network and the compute nodes.
The network nodes (Neutron) are connected to the cloud provider's edge router using
the eth0 interface. Traﬃc exits and enters the Internet here. The eth1 interface in
the Neutron nodes operates as the connection point to cloud's private network where
data is exchanged between all the necessary nodes. The compute nodes containing
the VMs are connected to this private network using the eth0 interface.
A more simple setup is displayed in Figure 4.2. There is now no separate network
node, and thus the public network is directly connected to the compute nodes. The
NAT and the ﬁrewalling are done by a ﬁrewall VM instead of a Neutron network
node running iptables and the NAT. Traﬃc between the VMs in the same compute
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Figure 4.1: Openstack cloud conventional setup using vSwitch module.
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Figure 4.2: Openstack cloud network utilizing virtual ﬁrewall.
node now ﬂows through the br-int bridge from one VM to another. Further, traﬃc
between the virtual machines located in the diﬀerent compute nodes ﬂows via a
physical switch plane and is separated by VLAN IDs. The solid green line represents
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traﬃc inside a node and the dotted line between the nodes.
VLAN function is necessary for building a safe and active environment. The
global IP addresses need to be isolated in a speciﬁc VLAN and be connected only to
a virtual ﬁrewall eth0 interface. This way the virtual ﬁrewalls communicate directly
with the cloud provider's edge router by using global IP addresses. This public
connectivity is represented by the red line from the edge router to the compute
node.
A major change like this provides countless opportunities. A global IP address can
now be directly assigned to a single VM without a NAT and a ﬁrewall. Unfortunately
it compromises security because ﬁrewalling should be done in each virtual server
separately. Also modiﬁcations can be made at least to Openstack compute node
networking modules. Since Linux bridge is used for gaining the iptables support,
which is no longer needed, the Linux bridge and VETH pair can be removed from
these modules. Such optimization is outside the scope of this thesis and should be
done as a future work.
4.3 Security Software Selection
Firewall software for virtual machines needs to be carefully chosen to fulﬁll the
requirements of the cloud platform and the tenant. These requirements include an
open source platform, a NAT, a stateful ﬁrewall, a VPN solution, a REST API and
a routing daemon. This is the basic setup each SECaaS solution should have.
Open source network operating systems can easily be found. Usually they are
based either on some Linux or BSD distribution such as Okapi, Pfsense, ClearOS and
Smoothwall [24, 25, 26, 27]. A NAT, a ﬁrewall and a VPN are included in all of these
software distributions but they lack the API. A setup on Debian GNU/Linux was
also considered but dismissed due to the time consuming and cumbersome inclusion
of the REST API feature [28]. Vyatta, on the other hand, was found to contain
the ﬁrewall, the routing daemon, the VPN and, most importantly, the REST API
[29]. These features are only in the enterprise version of Vyatta that is updated
by the vendor and is delivered with a cloud container template. Although costly,
this reduces the time and eﬀor of the cloud operator signiﬁcantly. Additionally,
the Amazon EC2 contains a template for Vyatta, allowing the private cloud to be
extended in Amazon through a VPN [30].
Based on these characteristics, the ﬁrewall VM, also called as the security in-
stance, chosen for this master's thesis was the Linux routing and ﬁrewall engine
called Vyatta Enterprise vRouter by Brocade. It provides a multifunctional Linux
distribution that can be used to secure internal network and to work as a VPN end-
point simultaneously. Vyatta's ﬁrewalling engine is done by using a Linux iptables
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package. Firewalling can be accomplished by using either per-interface policies or
zone based policies [31]. The zone based policies (see Chapter 2) were chosen for
this demonstration. Vyatta has PPTP, IPSec and OpenVPN features for site-to-site
and remote access VPN connections. Routing in Vyatta is with the Quagga routing
engine, which supports RIP, OSPF and BGP routing protocols. Vyatta has nor-
mally the NAT together with a ﬁrewall. In this thesis, Vyatta is placed between
the Internet and a private network containing many cloud VMs to provide Internet
connectivity for them. Thus the security instance operates as a gateway for all the
cloud VMs running in a virtual private cloud.
4.4 Management Aspects
The enterprise version of Vyatta has the control options of Command Line Interface
(CLI), Web UI and REST API. The most traditional of these three for ﬁrewall
controlling is the CLI. It has been widely used in most enterprise level ﬁrewall
appliances. A cloud platform requires a management interface for the tenant to
make changes to the cloud infrastructure when necessary. Since Vyatta is to be a
part of the cloud infrastructure, a combined cloud dashboard is needed. This is
illustrated in Figure 4.3
Cloud portal server
Deltacloud 
API drivers
Firewall management 
Backend
Cloud dashboard
Firewall management 
Frontend
Cloud 
platform 
Cloud 
platform 
Virtual machine 
management
Firewalls
SSH CLI
WebUI /API
Tenant
Figure 4.3: Centralized cloud platform and ﬁrewall management.
The cloud dashboard runs in a cloud portal server along with some other software
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components. The tenant connects either to the Cloud dashboard or directly to the
ﬁrewall SSH CLI for conﬁguration. The Cloud dashboard includes both the virtual
machine management and the ﬁrewall management frontend features. The VM
management communicates with the Deltacloud API drivers that further manage
the cloud platforms. The ﬁrewall management frontend commands its backend that
is then responsible for communicating with the ﬁrewalls. This section takes a brief
look of the ﬁrewall management through either the cloud dashboard or the ﬁrewall's
own WebUI and CLI.
4.4.1 Cloud Portal Server and Dashboard
Management of the security instance (Virtual ﬁrewall) is preferably done by a cus-
tomized interface called a cloud dashboard. It is not meant to fully replace the
ﬁrewall's own CLI or WebUI, but to make management more user-friendly and cen-
tralized. The dashboard provides conﬁgurations for most basic features as well as
state information for all the ﬁrewalls managed by a speciﬁc user account.
The ﬁrewall management backend uses REST API to execute operational and
conﬁguration mode commands (Chapter 5.3) in the ﬁrewall (Figure 4.3). The REST
API resembles a remote CLI, which provides multifunctionality. It thus oﬀers a
customizable controlling environment for the tenants based on their needs.
The ﬁrewall management frontend can also be called as a customized webUI.
It exists especially for creating and editing general conﬁgurations, NAT rules and
ﬁrewall policies. In addition to these, the frontend also provides information about
the ﬁrewall status, for example ﬁrewall policies and routing table. Log ﬁles stored in
/var/log/ are unreachable for the REST API as there is no appropriate command
to read them. More experienced users, however, can reach them via CLI.
For the general conﬁguration, the management frontend provides methods for
modifying details such as the hostname. The ﬁrewall policy conﬁguration is wider:
the user may select a zone, a rule number, IP addressing and port details as well as
a protocol. Removing a ﬁrewall rule means removing all the related settings. An
individual setting is bound to the rule and thus cannot be separately removed. A
NAT rule contains the rule number, IP addressing and port details together with
the protocol ﬁeld. The NAT rules may be removed only one by one. If the user
requires more conﬁgurable objects such as routing or VPN, CLI should be used via
SSH to reach them.
The central management simpliﬁes the ﬁrewall conﬁguration especially when the
user has a number of ﬁrewalls. The end user is no longer required to make a separate
CLI or WebUI connection to individual ﬁrewalls from their internal networks. The
dashboard further provides parallel conﬁguration for the ﬁrewalls. The manage-
ment server can, for example, send a conﬁguration command any number of times.
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Therefore sending a new Network Time Protocol (NTP) server information to all
the ﬁrewalls can now be done with only one command.
4.4.2 CLI and WebUI
A Command Line Interface (CLI) is the basic conﬁguration interface for a router
or a ﬁrewall device. Vyatta CLI is accessible from the local console of the ﬁrewall
instance or via the SSH, that provides an another remote conﬁguration method for
the user. The virtual ﬁrewall including the host Linux, can be controlled by the CLI
since it is set up on top of a Linux shell. The CLI is thus always available when
the user has access to the shell. The local console authentication always reqires a
username and a password whereas the SSH also supports a public key.
The CLI on Vyatta is similar to that of the Juniper JunOS CLI. Both contain the
same basic commands and the conﬁguration tree structure. The CLI is separated
in to the operational and the conﬁguration mode. The operational mode provides
commands for viewing the ﬁrewall state whereas the conﬁguration mode is used
for editing the system conﬁguration parameters. The aforementioned modes of the
REST API follow these same principles.
The WebUI is another friendly way to conﬁgure the ﬁrewall. It is alike a regular
ADSL ﬁrewall router WebUI. The WebUI operates on top of the lighttpd web server
daemon and thus is also responsible for the message exchange of the REST API.
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5 SECURITY INSTANCE IMPLEMENTATION
The SECaaS has been developed to be easily deployable by the end-user. This is
accomplished by an automated ﬁrewall initiation and bonding of the ﬁrewall with
the management dashboard. This chapter describes how the SECaaS can be used in
common setups and how to deploy it with the Openstack or with an another cloud
environment. The ﬁrewall VM's communication with the management server is also
discussed. Furthermore, some answers concerning the user limitations and system
security are provided.
5.1 The Common Setup and its Diﬃculties
When a company plans to outsource servers, a question may arise about building
a secure connection between the company internal network and the cloud server
network. A VPN is often chosen to provide such a secure multifunction tunnel.
However, the Openstack Neutron for instance does not provide VPN tunneling with
the Grizzly release and thus a virtual ﬁrewall that supports VPN tunnels, such as
Vyatta, is required. Figure 5.1 shows a common way to extend the company internal
network to a cloud network.
Edge router/ 
firewallEdge firewall/
Router/NAT
Cloud provider
Corporate  XYZ 
Environment
Vyatta
VPN Tunnel
Corporate internal 
network
Cloud instances
Corporate XYZ 
Cloud portal
server
Internet
Private cloud
network
Figure 5.1: Internal network extended in a private cloud.
The Corporate XYZ Environment in the ﬁgure represents a common enterprise
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level internal network and the Cloud Provider the cloud hosting company. Hosts
owned by a certain company are placed in the cloud in a network segment called the
private cloud. All hosts of a private cloud share the same subnet and communicate
with the Internet through the same router. The multifunctional virtual ﬁrewall
is placed between the Internet and the private cloud to protect servers as well as
to operate as a gateway to the Internet and as a VPN endpoint to the corporate
internal network.
A cloud network requires a NAT to be able to save IP address resources when a
private cloud network is set up. However, a NAT behind a NAT can cause trouble.
The Neutron allocates private IPv4 addresses for the VMs and provides the public
IP addresses as ﬂoating IPs using 1:1 NAT. The VM ﬁrewall also implements NAT
and thus overlapping IP addressing may occur. As described in Section 4.2, the
Neutron networking module in Openstack cloud needs to be removed to ensure
proper network functionality.
Figure 5.2 shows ﬁrewalling and relationships of common zones. There are four
diﬀerent zones: external, internal, local and VPN. The external zone is connected
to an untrusted network (the Internet) and the internal zone to a trusted network
(private cloud). The local zone is meant for traﬃc to the Vyatta ﬁrewall. The VPN
zone operates as a zone for networks linked by VPN connections. The end user
may modify the ﬁrewall rules using from-zone and to-zone statements. Each zone
contains also a non-conﬁgurable deny all rule. Its number is 10000, being the last
rule. Other rules (1-9999) are freely editable by the user.
Edge router/
firewall
Cloud provider
Vyatta
Cloud instances
Corporate XYZ 
Private cloud
Cloud portal
server
Internal 
zone
External 
zone
Local
zone
VPN
zone
Figure 5.2: Vyatta ﬁrewall zone assignment for a private cloud.
The cloud portal server is located in the cloud provider network and the users
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are able to control their ﬁrewall VMs through the cloud dashboard operating in this
server. The clients connect to the cloud portal server which then communicates with
the ﬁrewall VMs. The message structure used for communication between the cloud
portal server and a ﬁrewall is explained in Section 5.3.
The cloud portal server requires connectivity to the Vyatta REST API from the
external zone and thus a proper ﬁrewall rule needs to be created. This rule is called
a management permit rule and applied from the external zone to the local zone. No
other rule should block it.Therefore the management permit rule is set as the ﬁrst
rule. The rule provides security by allowing connections only from the cloud portal
server IP address. The destination port and the protocol should also be set to make
the rule stricter. An example ruleset is shown in Table 5.1.
Rule # Src. addr. Dest. addr. Src. port Dest. port Protocol action
1 v.x.y.z 0.0.0.0 0 56443 TCP PERMIT
10000 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 0 0 ANY DROP
Table 5.1: Example ﬁrewall ruleset from External zone to Local zone.
The VPN tunnel from the company internal network is terminated in the Vyatta
ﬁrewall and so another ﬁrewall rule needs to be created for it. The protocol and the
port follow the settings of VPN software. The ﬁrewall rule for the VPN connection
is set up between the external zone and the local zone. However, data inside the
tunnel ﬂows from the internal zone to the VPN zone and vice versa.
IPsec is commonly supported in ﬁrewall appliances and thus often utilized in
networks like that in Figure 5.1. The cloud provider network may prohibit the
negotiation of the VPN tunnel between the private cloud and the company internal
network. The IPsec faces this problem when the connection is made through a
NAT. The IPsec Authentication Header (AH) invalidates the authentication phase,
leading to malfunction [32]. Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has tried to
approach this with a NAT traversal (NAT-T) by forcing the IPsec to use the UDP in
the port 4500 [33]. This however has no eﬀect in the Openstack because the inbuilt
security group ﬁrewall does not allow even the Encapsulated Security Payload (ESP)
protocol, necessary to the IPsec, to pass through. Therefore the modiﬁcation to
remove the NAT (Section 4.2) is needed.
Another approach is to use other technology like SSL VPN for tunneling. Open-
VPN is an open-source SSL-based VPN product that operates on top of either TCP
or UDP protocol in a chosen port, making it compatible with the NAT. The ﬁre-
walling in the Openstack allows rule creating for corresponding traﬃc. Using SSL
VPN eliminates the need for modiﬁcations of the Openstack Neutron, yet achieving
the VPN functionality.
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5.2 Instance Deployment Phase
An automated ﬁrewall instance deployment is achieved when a cloud platform is
independently able to modify ﬁrewall instances and a cloud portal server. Without
this the SECaaS requires a lot of manual conﬁguration. Launching an instance to the
cloud is simple and setting up the connection between the management server and
the ﬁrewall requires little extra eﬀort. This section covers the automatic conﬁgura-
tion of the cloud portal server and the ﬁrewall instance. Also manual conﬁguration
is discussed.
5.2.1 Deployment in an Automated Cloud Environment
An automated ﬁrewall deployment in SECaaS only needs a cloud platform with an
ability to run custom scripts. The Openstack is one of these platforms and thus
was chosen as the demonstration platform. The deployment phases are shown in
Figure 5.3. First, the end user launches a new ﬁrewall instance to the cloud. Then
the cloud dashboard provides authentication and other metadata information for
the ﬁrewall management backend and the ﬁrewall instance. Finally an initialization
script sets up the ﬁrewall and applies default conﬁgurations to it.
1. End user:
-Launch new firewall 
instance to natively 
supported cloud
2. Cloud portal:
- Generate management password
- Crypt the management password using salt
- push crypted management password to metadata
- push user SSH public key to metadata
- push account, plaintext password, IP, 
  host ID, user ID to firewall database
3. Firewall instance runs cloudinit:
- Create new management account with crypted 
   password received from metadata
- Create new user account with public key received
- map interfaces with zones, create necessary
   firewall rules, create NAT 
- Change service ports to high number ports
4. Cloud portal: 
- Done
Figure 5.3: Deployment phases in an automated cloud environment.
When launching a ﬁrewall the end user has to take care of a proper interface
assignment and the choice of a right ﬂavor to match the needs of the instance. The
ﬁrst Ethernet interface (eth0 ) should be placed in an untrusted network and the
second (eth1 ) in a trusted one. A public SSH key should also be assigned to gain
SSH connectivity to the ﬁrewall.
The password of the ﬁrewall management account is generated and stored in
plaintext in the cloud dashboard because of the REST API, then encrypted and
delivered to the ﬁrewall. The encrypted password is transferred to the ﬁrewall using
cloud instance metadata information. Metadata is generated for every created VM
and saved to a cloud platform, and it remains stored as long as the instance exists.
As the Vyatta ﬁrewall is based on Linux, the password is encrypted with a salt value
and stored in a shadow password ﬁle compatible form. The end user SSH public key
is delivered to the ﬁrewall instance along with the password. The cloud dashboard
5. Security Instance Implementation 35
also stores instance information such as the account details, the IP address, the
ﬁrewall machine ID and the user ID in the ﬁrewall management backend database.
The cloudinit is a script in the client machine that runs default conﬁgurations
during the ﬁrst boot. Vyatta is based on a CLI and a speciﬁc conﬁguration tree
structure, thus the changes done by the cloudinit have to be committed to /con-
ﬁg/conﬁg.boot -ﬁle. The cloudinit script reads the metadata to set up the manage-
ment account and the SSH public key for the ﬁrewall VM.
Next the cloudinit script assigns IP addresses found in the metadata to the in-
stance. The script maps the eth0 to an untrusted zone and eth1 to a trusted zone.
Further, the script enables stateful packet ﬁltering, creates a basic outbound NAT
rule as well as basic ﬁrewall rules, and binds them to interfaces. An example setup
using a CLI for Vyatta is displayed in Appendix C.
The basic ﬁrewall rules allow all connections from a trusted network to an un-
trusted one and deny all opposite traﬃc. The ruleset allows the incoming manage-
ment connections (port 56443) from the untrusted network to the local zone. It
also allows incoming connections from the untrusted zone to port 56022 for SSH
connectivity. This leaves the ports 443 (HTTPS) and 22 (SSH) free for web and
SSH services in the cloud VMs. Also security is enhanced because these common
service ports are often targeted by automated vulnerability scanners.
5.2.2 Manual Conﬁguration
The cloud dashboard also has the ability to manually add ﬁrewall management in-
formation to the backend. Some cloud platforms (e.g. VMWare vCloud) do not
support running a custom script when an instance is launched. In these cases au-
tomation cannot be done, making manual ﬁrewall insertion necessary. Also the
customer may run Vyatta in the EC2 or in a server without virtualization. Cloud
dashboard can be used for controlling Vyatta ﬁrewall regardless of their location.
The manual steps for adding a ﬁrewall VM are shown in Figure 5.4. First the
instance needs to be launched and conﬁgured to operate on its own. When network
connectivity and account information are established the ﬁrewall is ready to be
added under the control of the cloud dashboard.
1. In  non-natively supported 
cloud environment:
- Launch a firewall instance
2. In the firewall 
instance:
- Set  username and 
password in the firewall CLI
- Create firewall rules to 
permit REST API 
3. In the management 
dashboard: 
- Add new firewall based on IP 
address, WebUI port, username 
and password
4. Done 
Figure 5.4: Adding ﬁrewall to central management system.
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The setup phase of the ﬁrewall instance is done manually by the VM administrator
after the launch. A username and a password need to be set in the CLI together
with the ﬁrewall rules to allow connections from the cloud portal server. The WebUI
port for the REST API should be changed in the lighttpd daemon conﬁguration ﬁle.
The cloud dashboard needs the global IP address and the port of the ﬁrewall
VM along with a username and a password to operate with REST API queries.
When these have been added to the ﬁrewall dashboard, the performs a few queries
to the ﬁrewall to verify the connection. These queries request for details such as
a hostname and an uptime. When these steps have been completed the ﬁrewall is
ready for use.
5.3 Centralized Management
The central ﬁrewall management of the cloud portal consists of frontend and back-
end software. The frontend is a part of the cloud dashboard whereas the backend
is independent software. These two can be distributed but more commonly they
operate on the same server.
The ﬁrewall management frontend is set up with two diﬀerent web program-
ming languages, HTML and Javascript. The HTML provides the page layout and
Javascript is needed for the web forms that are necessary for user interaction. The
user ﬁlls in information, it is gathered from the Javascript web forms, and sent to
the backend PHP code. When the frontend and the backend are on the same server,
an HTTP daemon that understands PHP language is essential. PHP performs well
as a backend because it is stateless and transparent to the end user. The PHP back-
end requires a ﬁrewall database that contains information on all the ﬁrewalls with
their IP addresses and authentication details. The ﬁrewall database can either be a
text ﬁle or a fully featured SQL database. A sequence diagram containing the client
browser, the frontend, the backend, the database and the ﬁrewall which illustrates
the interactions between the client, the dashboard and the ﬁrewall is displayed in
Figure 5.5.
The sequence diagram in the ﬁgure begins with the user authentication in the
frontend. It then delivers the authentication information to the backend which in
turn makes a query to the database, validating the user and returning information
about the manageable ﬁrewalls. The backend PHP stores this information for the
duration of the session, keeping the authentication valid whether the user requests for
fetching information or changing or removing conﬁguration. After the user control
is released from the dashboard, the PHP session is destroyed and re-authentication
is required.
After a successful authentication, the frontend expects the user to pick a number
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Figure 5.5: Cloud dashboard ﬁrewall authentication and operation sequence diagram.
of ﬁrewalls to edit and a task to perform. The backend veriﬁes the ﬁrewall selection
against the user information that was received from the database during the au-
thentication. Tampering with the target ﬁrewall information is noticed and illegal
requests are prohibited. When the user input is valid the task is sent to all chosen
ﬁrewalls. The backend receives a reply message from each ﬁrewall and delivers them
to the frontend to be displayed to the user.
The backend validates the user input. The frontend delivers the user input from
Javascript to the PHP backend using $_POST -method. These messages are user
generated so the input validity needs to be veriﬁed. The validation in the backend is
done by building a conﬁguration tree using arrays and then verifying the user input
against it. This procedure protects the ﬁrewall from faulty commands.
The backend also protects the ﬁrewall from removing or overrunning any vital
conﬁgurations. The protection includes the basic outbound NAT and the man-
agement permit rule. However, the CLI via local console or SSH can be used to
remove any of these conﬁgurations. The user limiting balances between protecting
the ﬁrewall and not totally restricting the user.
The PHP backend communicates with the ﬁrewall using REST API. The REST
API operates with HTTPS messages that can be built using cURL, for example.
The cURL is a library for URL transfer that provides multifunctional message cre-
ation for web services and thus performs well with REST API. A cURL message
requires a header containing authentication, application and HTTP request infor-
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mation together with a destination address. A valid cURL query from a Linux shell
to the Vyatta REST API requesting active resource information is as follows:
curl -k -i -u username:password -H "content-length:0" -H "Accept:
application/json" -X GET https://10.11.11.1/rest/op
The cURL is based on ﬂags. The -k ﬂag stands for insecure connection where the
server certiﬁcate is not veriﬁed. With the -i ﬂag, the output shows also the usually
hidden HTTP header. The -u ﬂag assigns authentication information to the REST
API query. The -H ﬂag sets the HTTP header content-length to zero and speciﬁes
the data to be JSON. The -X builds a custom query, for example get or delete. The
same message can be written in PHP as follows:
$headers = array ("Accept: application/json", "content-length:0");
$ch = curl_init();
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, "https://10.11.11.1/rest/op");
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYHOST, 0);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER, 0);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER, $headers);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_USERPWD, "username:password" );
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_HTTPAUTH, CURLAUTH_BASIC);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
// curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POST, true);
// curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_CUSTOMREQUEST, "DELETE");
$output = curl_exec($ch); // Firewall answer
curl_close($ch);
The PHP code ﬁrst creates a handle named $ch that is then used in the query.
Second, details like address and authentication information are added. The line
CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYHOST sets the query to avoid certiﬁcate veriﬁcation.
Third, plaintext username and password are inserted. A query is executed with
given parameters and the response gets stored in the variable $output. Finally, the
resource is released using the curl_close command. Other messages (Ch 3.3.1) can
be sent using the same structure by uncommenting either the CURLOPT_POST
or CURLOPT_CUSTOMREQUEST ﬁeld.
A REST API sequence diagram displaying information fetching from a ﬁrewall
is shown in Figure 5.6. The ﬁrewall management backend makes a post query to
the instance containing the requested information resource identiﬁer in the URI. For
example, the full URI to receive IP routing information is:
https://ip.address.of.firewall:56443/rest/op/show/ip/route
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POST, "show..."
201 Created, "/rest/op/A34F..."
GET, "/rest/op/A34F..."
200 OK, "response"
DELETE, "/rest/op/A34F..."
200 OK
Figure 5.6: Sequence diagram of ﬁrewall information fetching message exchange.
The ﬁrewall responds to the post message using 201 Created message containing
a resource ID. The backend fetches the real data from there using a get message. A
small delay is needed between the post and the get messages to allow the ﬁrewall time
to collect and process requested information. The delay veriﬁed during prototype
experiments to be long enough for every task is two seconds. The Vyatta's remote
access API guide claims the delete message to be useless because supposedly the
ﬁrewall automatically removes the reserved resource [34]. However, it turned out
during these experiments that this does not take place necessitating the use of
manual delete message.
Conﬁguring a ﬁrewall requires a more complicated message exchange. A common
example is illustrated in Figure 5.7. The conﬁguration phases are the same whether
using REST API or CLI: entering the conﬁguration mode, adding conﬁgurations,
and applying the commit, save and exit -commands. During the ﬁrst phase a post
message representing the conﬁgure command is sent to the ﬁrewall that again replies
using 201 Created containing the resource ID. In the second phase, the backend loops
through the put messages until there are no more conﬁguration parameters to be
sent. After this task, a commit is sent to the ﬁrewall using a post message. The
ﬁrewall answers with 200 OK containing the commit response. In case the commit
is not approved, ﬁrewall management stores the return message, displays it to the
user and sends a delete message to remove the resource reserved for the conﬁguration
session. Otherwise backend sends a save message to the ﬁrewall before the delete
message.
The sequence diagram in Figure 5.8 displays message exchange when the user
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POST, "configure"
201 Created, "/rest/conf/A34F..."
PUT, "/rest/conf/A34F.../command"
200 OK, "response"
DELETE, "/rest/conf/A34F..."
200 OK
POST, "Commit"
200 OK, "Commit response"
POST, "Save"
200 OK, "Save response"
LOOP
[until all commands sent]
ALT
[if Commit successful ]
Figure 5.7: Sequence diagram of ﬁrewall conﬁguration message exchange.
requires removal of conﬁgurations from the ﬁrewall. This is very similar to the
conﬁguration insert phase. However, only one put message containing a delete task
is required. The conﬁguration is hierarchical so an entire conﬁguration tree branch
can be removed at once. Commit and save commands are sent using a post message
to apply and save the conﬁguration and they are followed by a delete to remove the
allocated resource in the ﬁrewall.
5.4 Security Aspects
The cloud portal server and all virtualized ﬁrewalls can be reached from the Internet.
Thus the users can connect to the cloud dashboard from anywhere in the Internet
and the cloud portal server in turn can reach the ﬁrewalls. To be more exact, by
default the WebUI and the REST API of the ﬁrewalls are only connectable from
the cloud portal server's IP address. This protects the ﬁrewall management and the
cloud dashboard operates as an application proxy ﬁrewall. However, CLI can be
used to create a new REST API ﬁrewall rule to allow connections from a wider IP
address range.
The Vyatta ﬁrewall contains in this demonstration two user accounts: a separate
conﬁguration account for the cloud dashboard and a user account for the end user.
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POST, "configure"
201 Created, "/rest/conf/A34F..."
PUT, "/rest/conf/A34F.../delete"
200 OK, "response"
DELETE, "/rest/conf/A34F..."
200 OK
POST, "Commit"
200 OK, "Commit response"
POST, "Save"
200 OK, "Save response"
Figure 5.8: Sequence diagram of ﬁrewall conﬁguration removal message exchange.
The password for the former is 20 characters long and stored non-encrypted in the
backend database in the cloud portal server, which is safe as long as the database
remains intact. This is also a weakness that can easily compromise security. The
passwords are stored encrypted in the ﬁrewall and the cloud metadata thus remain
very secure.
The end user account is generated in the cloudinit phase and an SSH private
key is added to it. The account is created using a commonly known password to
enable login through the local shell, the SSH and the WebUI. The SSH only allows
logins with a private key, making it safe as nobody can enter the ﬁrewall via SSH
without this key. The ﬁrewalling rule protects the ﬁrewall from WebUI and REST
API connections from the Internet excluding the cloud portal server. An additional
rule to allow these connections can be created and thus it is highly recommended
that the end user should change the password right after launching the instance.
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6 DISCUSSION
This thesis demonstrates how a ﬁrewall can be virtualized to an IaaS cloud and how
a central management service is used to control a number of ﬁrewalls simultane-
ously. The virtual ﬁrewall oﬀers an on-demand service and extends beyond regular
ﬁrewalling functions. This is called Security-as-a-Service (SECaaS).
The prototype implementation was successfull as a proof-of-concept to oﬀer knowl-
edge on the SECaaS management and the Openstack Neutron. However, it is not
yet ready to be used in production. Convenient use would require more features,
and a security review should be performed.
The ﬁrewall, the VPN and the routing features of the SECaaS are likely to be
replaced in the near future by some built-in software of the IaaS cloud. A milestone is
already accomplished by the new release of the Openstack cloud platform (Havana)
with the Neutron network plugin that uses multiple service plugins such as Load-
Balancer-as-a-Service (LBaaS) and Firewall-as-a-Service (FWaaS). The LBaaS is
already in the Grizzly release and the FWaaS is being developed for the Neutron.
The Openstack networking currently contains security groups for ﬁrewalling. The
FWaaS includes stateful zone based ﬁrewalling and also next-generation ﬁrewalling
is being considered. [35]
When the FWaaS plugin is in use the Vyatta VM ﬁrewalling becomes unnecessary.
This compromises the required VPN feature, giving rise to another new Neutron
module called VPNaaS, VPN-as-a-Service. The VPNaaS, however, only supports
IPsec site-to-site tunneling which, on the other hand, usually gets the task done.
Also, IPsec is standardized technology, enabling cross-platform setups. The use
of FWaaS and VPNaaS means in practice that the cloud modiﬁcations required by
Vyatta, such as the network environment and the ﬁrewall management in the central
management portal, are no longer needed. [35]
The virtualized ﬁrewall is included in the Software Deﬁned Networking (SDN)
and the Network Functions Virtualization (NFV). The SDN speciﬁes how network
devices are managed by software. The main principles in the SDN are to separate the
control and data planes and to use a ﬂow based traﬃc forwarding. The control plane
is for management whereas the data plane is for operating with the traﬃc ﬁltering,
forwarding and routing. Further, the control plane management can be centralized
to cover all devices in a data center. This automates network management tasks.
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This enables rapid network deployment and provisioning through the data center.
The SDN controller can handle either virtual or physical devices, which makes the
environment highly elastic. Therefore The SDN is a cunning research topic for
providing on-demand data center services. [36]
The term NFV is often related with the SDN. It is complementary to the SDN but
neither depends on the other. The NFV consists of a number of network functions
such as the ﬁrewall, the NAT and the IDS just to name a few, and thus attempts
to transfer hardware appliances to hypervisors or the cloud. Furthermore, the SDN
and NFV are combined in the Software Deﬁned Data Center (SDDC), a data center
which is elastic and highly virtualized. All the SDDC services are -as-a-service and
as such deployed on-demand. Thus the time-to-market is minimized. [37, 38]
The commercial and the open-source software costs, beneﬁts and time consump-
tion should be compared to ﬁnd out the best possible outcome for cloud computing.
However, the inevitable requirements such as customized central cloud portal may
elevate the costs unexpectedly. What comes to the pros and cons of virtualization,
the NFV and SDN reduce the time required for conﬁguring and cabling devices, but
these are likely to need new hardware and thus cause extra expenses.
44
7 CONCLUSIONS
This Master's Thesis introduced a Security-as-a-Service concept that contains a
central management dashboard and an IaaS cloud supported virtual ﬁrewall. Vyatta
was chosen as ﬁrewall software due to its properties (the ﬁrewall, the VPN, the
routing daemon and the REST API). The Vyatta ﬁrewall security policies were
considered comprehensive and reliable thanks to the stateful inspection. Vyatta
has also been proven to handle complicated routing and VPN scenarios. OpenVPN
and IPsec VPN both perform well and site-to-site tunneling can be done with any
participant supporting either of these techniques.
The most commonly used ﬁrewall features can be conﬁgured from a central man-
agement dashboard. The key to the central management of Vyatta is the REST
API. It also allows the centralized management to control many ﬁrewalls in parallel.
Thus the dashboard is able to send a speciﬁc command theoretically to any number
of ﬁrewalls simultaneously. In practice, this is limited to a few thousand depending
on the available hardware and software resources.
A severe discovery was made with the cloud network. Cloud platform providers
often rely on a separate network component, like Openstack with Neutron. The
cloud platform software and even the whole cloud network needs to be modiﬁed to
enhance the ﬁrewall operation. Without modiﬁcations the network traﬃc may cause
extra load on the cloud as well as diﬃculties with the VPN function.
The SECaaS concept is likely to extend from the mere cloud to the entire data
center. This would mean combining the tenant's physical network in the data center
with the cloud's virtual network. Therefore a single ﬁrewall VM could protect
both the virtual and the hardware servers of a data center. Further, the ﬁrewall
management is transferred from the administrators to the end users.
The customers will require more and more on-demand services in the era of cloud
computing. SECaaS gives rise to the future data center model whereas the virtual
ﬁrewall heads for NFV. The multi-platform cloud's security and usability especially
beneﬁt from the SECaaS. These can however be achieved cost-eﬀectively in a single
platform cloud as well. The Openstack cloud has made progress in this with its new
release but still does not have any ultimate solution. The race for the best cloud
platform is going on, which elevates the requirements for the beneﬁt of the tenant.
The need for more virtualized network functions and *-as-a-Service remains.
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APPENDIX A: CISCO NOTATION ACL
EXAMPLE
access-list 101 permit icmp any any echo-reply
access-list 101 permit icmp any any ttl-exceeded
access-list 101 permit icmp any any unreachable
access-list 101 permit udp any any eq domain
access-list 101 permit udp any eq domain any
access-list 101 permit tcp any any eq domain
access-list 101 permit tcp any eq domain any
access-list 101 permit tcp any any eq www
access-list 101 permit udp any eq bootps any eq bootpc
access-list 101 deny ip any any
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APPENDIX B: SMTP APPLICATION PROXY
RULESET EXAMPLE
# Helo checks
mail.tld REJECT You are not mail.tld
mx1.mail.tld REJECT You are not mx2.mail.tld
mx2.mail.tld REJECT You are not mx2.mail.tld
localhost REJECT You are not me
# Recipient checks
/^\@/ 550 Invalid address format.
/[!%\@].*\@/ 550 This server disallows weird address syntax.
# Sender checks
mail.tld 554 Spam not tolerated here
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APPENDIX C: VYATTA FIREWALL EXAMPLE
PRE-SETUP
# Make the firewall stateful as default
set firewall state-policy established action accept
set firewall state-policy related action accept
set firewall state-policy invalid action deny
# Create a NAT to firewall
set nat source rule 10 outbound-interface 'eth0'
set nat source rule 10 source address '192.168.10.0/24'
set nat source rule 10 translation address 'masquerade'
# Assing interfaces to zones, create rule sets and bind them to zones
set zone-policy zone Untrust interface eth0
set zone-policy zone Trust interface eth1
set firewall name OUTBOUND rule 100 action accept
set firewall name INBOUND rule 9999 action deny
set zone-policy zone Untrust from zone Trust firewall name OUTBOUND
set zone-policy zone Trust from zone Untrust firewall name INBOUND
# Also the local-zone requires firewalling
set zone-policy zone LocalZone local-zone
set firewall name L_From_T rule 1 action accept
set firewall name L_From_U rule 100 action accept
set firewall name L_From_U rule 100 destination port 56022
set firewall name L_From_U rule 101 action accept
set firewall name L_From_U rule 101 destination port 56443
set firewall name L_From_U rule 101 source address 192.168.24.24
set firewall name L_From_U rule 9999 action deny
set zone-policy zone LocalZone from Trust firewall name L_From_T
set zone-policy zone LocalZone from Untrust firewall name L_From_U
# Create an account for the management server or the user
set system login user configureaccount authentication encrypted-password
'$1$r/s97RG3$MRpnD8Co00GBwO2BduyLz.'
set system login user configureaccount authentication public-keys
user@hostname key 'key'
set system login user configureaccount authentication public-keys
user@hostname type 'ssh-rsa'
set system login user configureaccount level 'admin'
